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A B S T R A C T
Ecosystems can buﬀer against adverse events, such as storms or pest outbreaks by reducing the probability of
harm and magnitude of losses. We conceptualise factors involved in the governance of insurance value provision,
drawing on the notions of protection and insurance, exogeneity and endogeneity, and allocation of rights and
responsibilities. Using riverine ﬂoods and forest pest outbreaks as examples, we explore the challenges of
governing ecosystem-based risk management. We suggest that such governance should build on existing in-
stitutions, because insurance value is jointly produced with provisioning ecosystem services and the governance
arrangements for them importantly shape insurance value provision. However, existing institutional arrange-
ments do not acknowledge involved actors' rights and responsibilities and they do not facilitate landscape level
management of risks. While PES schemes and other market-like solutions may govern the provision of insurance
value when transaction costs and trade-oﬀs between the provision of insurance value and private goods are low,
regulation or public provision is needed when transaction costs and trade-oﬀs are high. The complexity of
challenges in governing the provision of insurance value highlights the need for polycentric governance in-
volving collaboration, knowledge creation and dissemination and the funding of activities needed for them.
1. Introduction
Ecosystems can buﬀer against sudden adverse events and incre-
mental deterioration and losses, and thereby provide insurance value
(Baumgärtner, 2007). For example, vegetation cover reduces surface
water runoﬀ and thus ﬂood risk (Graves et al., 2015), and a diverse tree
species and age structure can reduce forest pest outbreaks (Dymond
et al., 2014). Some ecosystems, such as coastal marshes or forests on
steep mountain slopes, could be managed primarily or entirely for their
insurance value. Ecosystems such as oceans, mangroves and coral reefs
that are not subject to intense management provide important in-
surance values such as protection from abrupt climate change, sea
surges and storms, alongside other ecosystem services they provide. In
modiﬁed ecosystems, such as in commercially managed forests and
agricultural ecosystems, insurance value is typically a co-beneﬁt of
resource management.
Insurance value is poorly captured in the risk and cost-beneﬁt cal-
culations of land and resource managers and other actors seeking to
derive economic beneﬁts from ecosystems (Quaas and Baumgärtner,
2008), because the risk buﬀering capacity of ecosystems is typically a
public good. Often the existing governance arrangements for environ-
mental resources do not address the challenges of insurance value
provision which results in societal losses through sub-optimal provision
of insurance value. This is particularly the case with regard to modiﬁed
ecosystems, which are primarily used and managed for beneﬁts from
provisioning ecosystem services. They merit attention because they are
dominant ecosystem types in many places and because the trade-oﬀs
between diﬀerent ecosystem services pose complex governance chal-
lenges.
The provision of insurance value is not just of academic interest –
policy-makers and formal policy agendas increasingly acknowledge it
because it has potential to make the beneﬁts of environmental policies
more tangible. For example, the European Union's (EU) 2013
Adaptation Strategy promotes insurance with an aim to improve risk
awareness and prevention (EC, 2013b) and The Green Infrastructure
Policy (EC, 2013a) supports ecosystem-based disaster risk management
and spatial planning. The EU biodiversity strategy “Our Life Insurance,
Our Natural Capital” similarly promotes ecosystem-based approaches to
climate change mitigation and adaptation through conservation, re-
storation and sustainable management (EC, 2011). In the United States,
ecological engineering has emerged as an approach to ecosystem re-
storation (e.g. Nesshöver et al., 2017), for enhanced resilience. The
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is also pro-
moting nature-based solutions as an umbrella concept for a range of
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T
ecosystem-related approaches for addressing societal challenges
(Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016).
The problem is that the notion of insurance value is not yet con-
ceptualised clearly enough for operationalisation. In particular, solu-
tions for the governance of insurance value provision have received
limited attention in the literature to date. One exception is the gov-
ernance of the provision of green roofs reducing the risk of surface
ﬂooding and the impacts of heat exposure in cities, which has been
shown to be promoted more successfully by regulatory policies com-
bined with incentive schemes than by strategies relying on markets or
information provision (Mees et al., 2013). Another example is the
governance of mountain grasslands in Austria, France and Norway,
where insurance value is a co-beneﬁt of agricultural production: the
diverse, extensively managed ecosystems provide a buﬀer against
shocks and support the farmers' ability to adapt and transform their
farming systems and involvement in tourism (Schermer et al., 2016).
In the reminder of this article we conceptualise and systematise the
factors involved in, and constituting, the governance of insurance value
provision in Section 2 and exemplify issues involved in modiﬁed agri-
cultural and forest ecosystems in Sections 3 and 4. We suggest the in-
terrelated notions of protection and insurance, exogeneity and en-
dogeneity of risks as well as rights and responsibilities help map the
landscape of governing the provision of insurance value and its chal-
lenges and to link the analysis of governance to economic and other
theorizing of insurance value and its provision. For example, these
notions help clarify the roles of actors in the provision of insurance
value, and how its provision involves important issues of environmental
justice such as whether beneﬁciary or polluter pays and whether pro-
tection against risk should be the responsibility of individuals or the
state. In section 5, we relate our arguments and observations to the
literature on risk management and ecosystem service governance, and
in Section 6 we draw analytical and policy conclusions.
2. What Does Governance of Insurance Value Need to Address?
The provision of insurance value can be the sole or key purpose of
land or resource management, for example in protected areas main-
taining species diversity and resilience against pests, buﬀer zones pro-
tecting sources of public water supply, or forests on steep mountain
slopes managed to reduce the risk of landslides. In these cases, in-
surance value provision trumps or constrains other resource uses. While
it is easy to identify examples of above and other situations where in-
surance value provision can be the highest management priority, hardly
any literature exists that would speciﬁcally examine the provision of
insurance value and its governance in these settings. The situation with
co-incidental insurance value provision from lightly managed ecosys-
tems is comparable. For example the protection oﬀered by mangroves
and salt marshes against coastal erosion and storm surges has received
attention in the literature (e.g. Danielsen et al., 2005; Gedan et al.,
2011) but focus is on physical buﬀering capacity and provisioning,
rather than on governance.
In modiﬁed agricultural and forest ecosystems, decisions about the
provision of insurance value are made by land managers whose primary
concern is the production of private goods such as timber, food or en-
ergy. These goods are provisioning ecosystem services which are often
jointly produced with cultural ecosystem services for amenities or re-
creation, and regulating services contributing to ecosystem stability and
resilience. It is the regulating services that typically provide insurance
value. Provisioning services are often characterized by rival consump-
tion and excludability and their provision is typically governed by
private property rights and markets (Paavola, 2007, 2009). Cultural
and regulating ecosystem services are often non-rival and diﬃcult to
exclude from. That is, they are usually either club goods and public
goods. Both of them are amenable to non-rival consumption but be-
cause of lower exclusion costs club goods make cost-recovery possible
and they can be self-provided or provided over the markets unlike
public goods. Therefore, club goods and public goods pose diﬀerent
challenges for the governance of provision than private goods (Ostrom,
1990; Paavola, 2009).
The joint production of private and public goods is a key governance
challenge for insurance value provision (Farley and Costanza, 2010: p.
2061), particularly in modiﬁed ecosystems in which provisioning eco-
system services are prioritised. Existing arrangements have been es-
tablished primarily to govern the provisioning services, so insurance
value provision is just a co-beneﬁt of economic activities. If there are
trade-oﬀs between the provision of private goods of provisioning eco-
system services and the public good of insurance value, the level of
insurance value provision will remain low. This is because insurance
value is not formally recognised and there are no incentives for its
provision. Land and resource managers are unable to recover the costs
of public good provision in the absence of speciﬁc institutional ar-
rangements supporting cost recovery. Particularly in settings with dif-
fuse land-ownership resulting in many providers and beneﬁciaries, it is
costly to establish and operate such institutions and therefore they often
do not exist.
Insurance value provides economic beneﬁt because it can reduce
risk-related losses. Risk is often understood as the product of the
probability and magnitude of adverse consequences. We can thus dis-
tinguish between protection – measures that reduce the likelihood of an
adverse event – and insurance – measures that reduce losses caused by
an adverse event (Pascual et al., 2015). For example, a ﬂood plain
provides ‘natural protection’ if it reduces the likelihood of a ﬂooding
event downstream. An example of ‘natural insurance’ (Quaas and
Baumgärtner, 2008) is oﬀered by urban green space, which can reduce
the adverse consequences of a heat wave (Green et al., 2016). We
suggest that both these risk management functions are captured by the
notion of ‘insurance value of ecosystems’. Conceptually, insurance value
is manifested as the reduction of the risk premium that a risk-averse
agent would be willing to sacriﬁce to fully eliminate the risk
(Baumgärtner, 2007).
Because the above conceptualisations of insurance value have im-
plications for both land managers who provide and other actors who
beneﬁt from insurance value, explicit attention needs to be paid to the
endogeneity and exogeneity of risk. A forest-owner or a farmer with
monocultures of trees or crops is exposed to an endogenous risk of pest
infestations which could be reduced by diversifying the species struc-
ture on their land, and thereby providin self-protection and -insurance
(Pascual et al., 2015). Similarly, vegetation cover on the land-owner's
or manager's land can increase the resilience against ﬂooding and im-
prove recovery, implying that the risk is endogenous. Exogenous risks
occur when pest outbreaks originate in the neighbours' uniformly
managed forests (Jactel et al., 2009; Bartkowski, 2017) and when
ﬂooding is caused or aggravated by actions of land managers in the
upper catchment.
Understanding of both endogenous and exogenous risks as well as
responses to them is aﬀected by risk perception. Key factors inﬂuencing
risk perception include: 1) previous (or direct) experience of events; 2)
indirect experience such as information provided by the mass media or
other communication channels, and; 3) trust in authorities and risk
mitigation measures such as ﬂood defences (see Wachinger et al., 2013;
Cologna et al., 2017). Risk perceptions can vary widely even for the
same risk, as actors' past experience of risk events diﬀer, their exposure
to, and capacity to obtain and use, information varies, and they have
varying degrees of trust in authorities and technological interventions.
However, what endogenous and exogenous risks are is not given
also for another reason: one land manager's exogeneous risk can be-
come an endogenous risk to all similarly situated land managers at the
landscape scale. The governance arrangements play a crucial role here:
they can either leave individual actors to face and manage a risk in-
dividually, or the governance arrangements can involve varied collec-
tive strategies to manage the risks. At the same time, the choice of
governance arrangements distributes the responsibility and costs of risk
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management in speciﬁc ways, and they also inﬂuence the level of re-
sidual losses and their distribution (see e.g. Eakin et al., 2009). That is,
the governance arrangements determine the environmental justice
outcomes with regard to risk exposure and management.
The existing rights and responsibilities regarding ecosystem man-
agement determine the combinations of ecosystem service ﬂows that
will be produced, as well as the relative volumes of the ﬂows. Because
these ﬂows are jointly produced, the provision of insurance value is
inextricably linked to the governance of other ecosystem services.
Rights and responsibilities are most clearly deﬁned for provisioning
ecosystem services through property rights deﬁning the right to extract
resources and to manage them (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Therefore,
it is important to consider these rights and responsibilities in the ana-
lysis of how insurance value provision is governed. This will also help
identify the potential institutional changes required for better govern-
ance of insurance value provision.
Depending on the governance arrangements, the beneﬁciaries of
insurance value could have a right to protection and insurance. This
would entail management and precautionary responsibilities for land
managers as providers. However, often rights and responsibilities are
not explicitly or clearly deﬁned. Insurance value may remain subject to
only very general rights such as constitutional rights to sustainable
environment, which does not create explicit responsibilities to provi-
ders. Insurance value provision could also rely on customary arrange-
ments, and the beneﬁciaries hold mere informal rights (Ostrom, 1990;
Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2013; Lockie et al., 2013). Finally, where ex-
plicit formalised rights and responsibilities exist, there can still be
spatial mismatches between the jurisdictions and the scales at which
insurance value provision decisions need to be made and implemented
(Young, 2002; Vatn and Vedeld, 2012).
In what follows, we will exemplify the governance of insurance
value provision and its challenges in ﬂood risk management in the River
Aire Catchment in the UK, and in forest pest management in Finnish
managed forests. The examples illustrate the issues to be addressed
when designing governance arrangements and help us ground our
discussion to speciﬁc biophysical and institutional settings. Yet the
observations are relevant for other settings as well, after accounting for
diﬀerences in contexts. We examine the interrelated dimensions of
governing insurance value provision: 1) protection against adverse
events and insurance against losses; 2) endogeneity and exogeneity of
insurance value provision; 3) rights and responsibilities of actors
managing ecosystems and beneﬁting from insurance value, and; 4)
existing governance mechanisms and their implications for insurance
value provision. Based on the analysis, we discuss existing and potential
governance arrangements, and draw conclusions on the governance of
insurance value and its analysis.
3. Land Use and Flood Control
City of Leeds in United Kingdom is located in the catchment of the
River Aire, which ﬂows for 148 km from its source in the Yorkshire
Dales to its conﬂuence with the River Ouse. The catchment is 1100 km2
in area (Environment Agency, 2010). The upper catchment is char-
acterized by steep sided narrow valleys but to the South of Leeds the
valleys become shallow and wide. The catchment is home to 1,050,000
people; three quarters of them living in the Leeds Metropolitan Area.
Urban land use occupies 22% of the catchment (Environment Agency,
2010).
There have been signiﬁcant ﬂoods in and around Leeds for ages
(Leeds City Council, 2011) but they have been exacerbated by the
sealing of natural surfaces, culverting and other modiﬁcations of wa-
tercourses as well as land conversion for agricultural and other uses. To
control ﬂoods, there are over 120 km of raised defences in communities
across the catchment. If current ﬂood protection measures were not in
place, over 13,000 properties would be at risk from a hundred-year
ﬂood (Environment Agency, 2010). But the current ﬂood protection
measures do not provide protection for all properties: for example,
during the winter ﬂoods of 2015/16, over 1000 properties were ﬂooded
in the catchment. A substantial ﬂood alleviation scheme is being con-
structed to protect the central parts of the City of Leeds and, to improve
resilience, a catchment-wide programme of ecosystem-based ﬂood risk
reduction measures is being planned as a national pilot project.
Climate change is further increasing the ﬂood risk, and is already
aﬀecting Leeds. Although the annual rainfall has not changed, extreme
weather conditions causing ﬂooding particularly in winter are in-
creasingly frequent (Dadson et al., 2017). According to the UKCP09
Climate Projections, peak river ﬂows could increase by 15–30% by
2025–2055, and by 20–50% after 2055, according to central estimates
(Environment Agency, 2010).
3.1. Protection - Insurance
Urban and rural ecosystems can oﬀer protection against the risk of
riverine ﬂooding by enhancing evaporation, absorbing water into the
unsealed soil or by retaining and ﬁltering water (Collentine and Futter,
2016). Water retention, ﬂow retardation and water ﬁltration are often
produced jointly with other ecosystem services, such as food, recreation
and cultural landscape, and provide co-beneﬁts such as biodiversity,
health and cultural identity (Dadson et al., 2017; Wilkinson et al.,
2014).
Natural insurance against risk of riverine ﬂooding can be provided
by implementing nature-based solutions (NBS) (Nesshöver et al., 2017;
Dadson et al., 2017; Farrugia et al., 2013; Green et al., 2016; Morris
et al., 2016). NBS for ﬂood risk management include establishing new
woodlands or converting arable land to grazing in the upper catch-
ments. Riverbeds can also be altered e.g. by building leaky dams or
restoring meanders to enhance ﬂow retardation, and excess water can
be stored in ponds, wetlands and ﬂoodplains (Dadson et al., 2017). The
upstream NBS lower the peak ﬂows by reducing runoﬀ or by spreading
the runoﬀ over a longer time. Therefore, they can reduce both the
probability of ﬂooding and losses when ﬂooding occurs (Dadson et al.,
2017). The evidence base on the eﬀectiveness of NBS is still incomplete
but at least the risk of losses due to small and frequent ﬂoods at small
scales can be managed with NBS (Salazar et al., 2012; Iacob et al., 2014;
Dadson et al., 2017; Morris et al., 2016). That is, NBS can increase the
resilience in catchments with regard to small and moderate ﬂood
events.
3.2. Endogeneity – Exogeneity
Riverine ﬂooding could be an endogenous risk at the catchment
level. While water resources can be managed at catchment level under
the Water Framework Directive, the management entities do not
usually have the authority or control over all land uses aﬀecting ﬂood
risk across catchments under existing governance arrangements.
Therefore, riverine ﬂooding remains an exogenous risk to downstream
homeowners and farmers who cannot inﬂuence the probability and
magnitude of ﬂood events.
The actors that can manage the ﬂood risk in terms of probability and
magnitude are upstream land and water managers. The key dilemma is
that the insurance value provided through nature-based ﬂood control
solutions is a public good. When natural insurance involves joint pro-
duction of private and public goods (Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2010),
there are likely to be at least some trade-oﬀs that should be addressed.
Private providers have little incentive to provide natural insurance if
they cannot recover their costs. Therefore, the responsibility for ﬂood
risk management is often either assumed by the public sector or it is
omitted entirely. Those exposed to ﬂood risk can take measures to re-
duce losses when ﬂooding occur, however: these measures can include
defensive investments or insurance, for example.
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3.3. Rights – Responsibilities
Landowners in the upper catchment of River Aire do not have any
responsibility to undertake measures that reduce the risk of ﬂooding
downstream, nor to avoid actions that increase ﬂood risk.
Correspondingly, downstream farmers and landowners do not have
right to natural insurance. Those at risk can take commercial ﬂood
insurance for example as a part of their buildings and contents in-
surance. However, a commercial insurance only covers asset losses. In
the UK, building insurance is voluntary, which leads to low-income
households not obtaining insurance, although they are often located in
areas of high ﬂood risk (Paavola, 2017). The availability of insurance
can also weaken the incentives for the adoption of measures to avoid
ﬂood losses: insurance will enable the recovery of losses without trying
to reduce the probability or magnitude of adverse outcomes.
The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs
(Defra) has the national responsibility for policy on ﬂood risk man-
agement, and it funds ﬂood risk management through grants to the
Environment Agency and local authorities. The Environment Agency
has strategic responsibility for ﬂood risk management and speciﬁc re-
sponsibility for managing the risk of ﬂooding from the main rivers.
Local authorities are responsible for developing and implementing a
strategy for local ﬂood risk management and for maintaining a register
of ﬂood risk assets (Kenyon et al., 2008). They also have the lead re-
sponsibility for managing the risk of ﬂooding from surface water,
groundwater and ordinary watercourses.
The jurisdictions of local authorities that are responsible for ﬂood
risk management do not spatially coincide with catchments. This means
that the authorities cannot consider all risk reduction measures on the
same footing. Measures within their own jurisdiction include plans and
regulations but extra-jurisdictional concerns need to be addressed to-
gether with other authorities. These mismatches have led to localised
defensive action to manage ﬂood risk using grey infrastructure, often
just relocating the ﬂood risk, rather than catchment level considerations
of nature-based solutions.
3.4. Governance
At the moment, there is no comprehensive governance framework
in place to enforce or incentivise the provision of natural insurance
against ﬂood risk in the UK. Grey ﬂood defences are mostly and at least
partly publicly funded, and they are typically purpose-speciﬁc without
co-beneﬁts. Availability of commercial ﬂood insurance for home
owners and farmers is partly accentuating the problem, as it compen-
sates for ﬂood losses and removes the incentive to seek reduction of the
probability and magnitude of losses.
Authorities responsible for ﬂood risk management act as brokers
between the potential providers and beneﬁciaries of insurance value,
redeﬁning or rearranging the rights and responsibilities concerning
ﬂood risk and its management, as well as (re)distributing the costs and
beneﬁts of insurance value provision. They have a range of institutional
alternatives for doing so, including (see Morris et al., 2016):
• Purchase of upstream land for public ownership for ﬂood risk
management, without or with a lease back for compatible land uses;
• Regulation or planning standards to ensure the implementation of
ﬂood risk management measures on private land;
• Mandatory and compensated easements for ﬂood water storage;
• Capital grants and annual payments to private landowners for the
provision of ﬂood risk management services;
• Other payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes or auctions to
incentivise the provision of ﬂood risk management on private land,
or taxes or charges for dis-incentivising risk increasing management.
Outright purchase, regulation and easements are suitable for en-
suring long-term provision of ﬂood risk management, and often to
provide protection against major ﬂood events. These solutions often
need to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Capital grants and eco-
nomic instruments suit shorter-term provision of additional ﬂood risk
reduction and control of recurrent smaller ﬂoods (Morris et al., 2016).
Payments and auctions acknowledge land managers' rights when allo-
cating new responsibilities to them. The choice of governance ar-
rangements to enhance provision of insurance value thus deﬁnes rights
and responsibilities and distributes the costs and beneﬁts of provision in
speciﬁc ways.
4. Forest Biodiversity and Pest Control
In Finland, over 20 million hectares of forest cover over three
quarters of the country. These forests provide numerous ecosystem
services, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling and water
regulation, which are produced jointly with timber, berries, mush-
rooms, game, recreation and cultural identity (Saarikoski et al., 2015).
Over half a million mostly small-scale, non-industrial private forest
holdings cover 61% of Finland's forest area, and generate about 75% of
the country's timber growth. The forest owners have been a target of
systematic regulation and guidance for over a century, with increas-
ingly sophisticated information management and sharing systems
(Hujala et al., 2007; Primmer and Wolf, 2009). The dominant forest
management regime involves less than 100 year rotation – even less
than 70 years – and clear-cuts, which results in even-aged forests. Ty-
pically one native conifer species, Norwegian spruce or Scots pine,
dominates but naturally seeding native deciduous trees are retained
during the rotation.
Finnish forest policy has tackled many challenges from sustainable
yields to biodiversity degradation and social inclusion. Climate change
has created the latest opportunities and threats (Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry, 2014a,b). Timber growth is expected to increase but ex-
treme weather events and warm winters will create new risks (Lindner
et al., 2010; Peltonen-Sainio et al., 2017; Seidl et al., 2017). New insect
species will spread north, and pest damages increase. Windfalls con-
centrating on edges of clear cuts (Zeng et al., 2009) further increase
pest outbreak risk.
4.1. Protection – Insurance
Forest pest damage is controlled with salvage loggings and tree
removals, to halt epidemic waves of damage (Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry, 2014b; Peltola, 2014). Yet, there is evidence that natural
structural features such as species and age mix and presence of dead
wood could provide ecosystem and landscape level resistance against
large scale pest damage (Lindenmayer and Noss, 2006; Jactel et al.,
2009; Brang et al., 2014). The insurance value generated by the re-
covery capacity of the ecosystem resulting in resilience would also
contribute to the provision of other ecosystem services such as timber
growth, water retention and recreation (Drever et al., 2006; Isbell et al.,
2011; Saarikoski et al., 2015; Felton et al., 2016a, 2016b; Bartkowski,
2017). The resilience improving function of natural forest structure is
recognised in the forest management guidelines (Tapio, 2014), a lightly
enforced soft standard, but its relationship with removals as a control
and preventive action is not clear.
Recent (2013) Finnish forest damage legislation de-emphasises
natural insurance produced by natural structural features, by requiring
forest owners to remove any dead or damaged spruce exceeding 10m3
and pine exceeding 20m3 per hectare, even if the trees are scattered.
Before this change in law, requirements were less stringent, with only
groups or heaps of dead trees exceeding 25m3 needing to be removed.
The average amount of dead wood in managed forests is 4.7 m3 per
hectare and protected areas have twice as much. In contrast, natural
Boreal forests have over ten times more dead wood (Siitonen, 2001).
The change in law is likely to shift the perceptions about dead and
damaged trees away from insurance value providing natural features
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toward creator of infestation risk, and further emphasize the need to
salvage also the income from these trees.
Wind damage, which generates dead wood potentially triggering
pest infestations, can also be controlled by silvicultural choices:
avoiding heavy thinning, designing the clearcutting areas so that they
do not face old stands, and using thinned buﬀers to reduce windfalls
(Zeng et al., 2009; Kolström et al., 2011; Tapio, 2014). These measures
add to logging costs but their beneﬁts might be captured in a short
period of time.
Insurance companies oﬀer policies against insect damage but their
primary product is insurance against storm damage. The dead trees are
removed soon after the storm damage, to maximise timber revenue and
to avoid pest infestations. The implications of commercial insurance on
managing for natural diversity and insurance value through resilience
remain unclear.
4.2. Endogeneity – Exogeneity
Finnish forest owners appreciate the ecosystem services their forests
provide (Primmer et al., 2014) and forestry professionals acknowledge
the importance of natural structural features that promote biodiversity
in managed forests (Primmer and Karppinen, 2010). This suggests that
pest risk management could be considered endogenous.
However, there is lack of understanding of the level of control that
an individual has over pest outbreaks. It arises from the contradictory
scientiﬁc evidence on natural diverse structural features contributing to
resilience at a landscape level, yet at times increasing the pest in-
festation risk (Drever et al., 2006; Jactel et al., 2009). This is reﬂected
in the forest management guidelines that promote natural pest re-
sistance in the forest ecosystem but, on the other hand, suggest limiting
the amount of damaged and dead wood to control outbreaks (Tapio,
2014). The new forest regulations provide a clear disincentive to pro-
mote diverse structural features, signalling control of an endogenous
problem that can have negative externalities and hence be portrayed as
exogenous for the neighbours.
4.3. Rights – Responsibilities
The right to a resilient landscape where pest outbreaks do not grow
into uncontrollable infestations is with the neighbouring forest-owners
and the entire community of forest-owners at the landscape level. This
right is currently formally secured only by the salvage removals of
damaged trees based on the Forest Damage Act (2013). However, the
longer term landscape level resilience provided by natural diverse
structural features is not formally secured. It is promoted only with the
best management practice guidelines, a soft governance instrument.
The forest-owner is responsible for compensating infestation da-
mage on neighbours' forests. In legally protected valuable habitats,
more damaged trees can be retained, conditional on a formal notice to
the authorities, but the liability to compensate pest damages remains
the same. If a pest infestation starts in a protected area, the government
compensates aﬀected landowners. This tort law has not been applied to
date in a pest infestation case between private forest-owners (personal
communication with the Finance and Audit Manager of the Forest
Centre over email 30.8.2017). The advice and control responsibility is
with the Finnish Forestry Centre (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
2014a), a node in the national forestry extension system implementing
the best practice guidelines (Primmer and Wolf, 2009).
4.4. Governance
Biodiversity contributes to forest ecosystem resilience in complex
and diﬀuse ways and it needs to be enhanced to secure a public good
like insurance value. The diverse forest structure controlling pest out-
breaks can be a “club good” (Ostrom, 1990), as the neighbouring forest-
owners are dependent on each other in controlling the pest populations.
The complex ecosystem processes and interactions that generate resi-
lience at spatial and temporal scales beyond the forest owners' man-
agement unit and time-span are hard to motivate while the risk of
sudden pest infestations speaks to risk aversion.
There are no markets or ﬁnancial incentive mechanisms in place for
governing natural insurance through diverse structural features across
the landscape. The collective action opportunities of governing in-
surance value are not addressed in the current system, other than col-
laboration among authorities. The formally delineated risk governance
for forest damages (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2014b)
highlights risk management with control, placing the responsibility on
controlling authorities, including:
• Legislation to generate a basis for forest damage prevention and
readiness for action in case of damage: assigning mandates for or-
ganizations, supporting collaboration, and deﬁning the precau-
tionary and reactive activities.
• Risk management plans supported by continuous monitoring of
forest health: relying on collaboration of forest, weather, environ-
mental and other agencies.
• Preparedness rehearsals at national and local levels.
If more natural structures were to be generated on a voluntary basis,
a more landscape-level approach would be required, to account for the
club good character of resilience against pests. A payment for ecosystem
services scheme could be applied; recent results indicate that forest
owners are interested in such incentives (see Sheremet et al., 2018), and
Finnish forest owners have experience with PES (Primmer et al., 2013).
The legal liability for pest damages might also need to be re-interpreted
because it dis-incentivises provision of natural insurance. However,
even a narrower liability rule would be likely to weigh more than the
voluntary soft standards supporting natural insurance because there is a
tendency in the Finnish forest sector to comply with law (Similä et al.,
2014).
5. Discussion
5.1. Insurance Value Governance Void
Although the insurance value of ecosystems has been acknowledged
in the literature and in the policy agendas, the governance of its pro-
vision has received limited attention. Such governance is more
straightforward when insurance value is the sole or priority purpose of
resource management, as is the case with protected areas, buﬀer zones
or forest cover in steep mountain slopes. It is co-incidental when lightly
or non-managed ecosystems provide insurance value in conjunction
with other ecosystem services. However, settings where an ecosystem is
managed for provisioning services require more attention. Our analysis
addresses the governance challenge of producing public good like
natural insurance alongside private goods.
The insurance value of modiﬁed ecosystems is a public good pro-
duced jointly with private goods. That is, in modiﬁed ecosystems in-
surance value is provided as a co-beneﬁt through varied governance
arrangements the main purpose of which has been to govern the use
and management of provisioning ecosystem services (Fisher et al.,
2008; Primmer et al., 2015). In the presence of trade-oﬀs between
provisioning services and insurance values, the ﬂows of the latter ones
are likely remain sub-optimal, because the providers cannot recover the
cost of public good provision in the absence of institutions supporting
cost recovery.
Enhanced provision of insurance value would need new institutions
that address the cost of provision (and knowledge management to take
into consideration the diﬀuse co-beneﬁt streams of resource use that
relate to other policy areas, such as biodiversity, climate change or
sustainable use of natural resources (Paavola, 2007; Primmer and
Furman, 2012; Collentine and Futter, 2016; see also Farley and
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Costanza, 2010; Chan et al., 2017). Despite potential synergies, these
policy areas have their own legacies, which calls for institutional tai-
loring and new forms of information management when integrating
them with insurance value provision.
The examples we examined help make several more detailed ob-
servations and arguments and identify how governance of natural in-
surance provision could be developed further. They indicate that
nature-based solutions to risk management require the consideration of:
• Ecosystem functions that generate insurance value alongside other
ecosystem services
• The spatial and institutional aspects of risk allocation, and;
• The institutional framework that implicitly and explicitly deﬁnes (or
leaves undeﬁned) the rights and responsibilities of beneﬁciaries and
providers of insurance value.
Our examples suggest that legal and contractual rights and re-
sponsibilities are often assigned to those who can manage risks in the
relevant spatial and temporal scales, e.g. by building artiﬁcial ﬂood
defences or by conducting salvage loggings. Yet reduction of the
probability of harm and increasing resilience using nature-based solu-
tions would require management on bigger spatial and temporal scales
than current governance arrangements do (Wachinger et al., 2013;
Fischer and Charnley, 2012). The relevant scales of political jurisdic-
tions and ecosystems have been noted to seldom coincide (Young, 2002;
Clement et al., 2017). Our examples indicate that this problem is ex-
acerbated when the actors who could manage risks and those who are
exposed to them operate at diﬀerent scales.
Thus the current arrangements for coordination and collective ac-
tion are not tuned to addressing landscape-level resilience or catch-
ment-level ﬂood risk management, nor to facilitating arrangements that
would allow negotiation or trading of beneﬁts across the landscape. Our
analysis also indicates that often the emphasis in risk management is on
a quick ﬁx rather than on investing in resilience for natural insurance.
For example, the removal of dead trees to control forest pest infesta-
tions is simpler than improving landscape level resilience. A dam con-
struction to protect a speciﬁc area from ﬂooding is more straightfor-
ward than developing retention upstream. The spatial mismatch also
means that regulatory and planning based solutions for insurance value
provision do not work when provision requires extra-jurisdictional
measures.
The examples also indicate that existing governance arrangements
for ecosystem service provision rarely deﬁne the rights and responsi-
bilities of involved and aﬀected actors. In particular, potential bene-
ﬁciaries of reduced risks seldom seem to have rights to natural in-
surance. The payments for ecosystem services schemes have been noted
to acknowledge the rights of potential providers but to omit the rights
of beneﬁciaries (Vatn, 2010; Lockie, 2013; Primmer et al., 2013; Chan
et al., 2017).
5.2. Insurance Value Governance Options
In our examples a complex set of institutions is already involved in
the governance of insurance value provision, although mostly indirectly
and unintentionally. A challenge is that the existing arrangements
create trade-oﬀs between the provision of insurance value and other
ecosystem services because they mostly give eﬀect to the already in-
stitutionalised rights. The existing institutions either need to be re-
formed, or new layers of institutions created to complement the existing
ones, to foster the provision of insurance value. Several diﬀerent stra-
tegies are available for this although we consider introduction of new
layers as a most promising strategy giving rise to more polycentric
forms of governance.
Private-to-private payments could be used for insurance value pro-
vision. Upstream-downstream payment arrangements are a classic ex-
ample, although they have been found not to be able to fully address
joint production of beneﬁts (Kosoy et al., 2007). To function, private-to-
private payments require clear deﬁnition of rights and low transaction
costs, i.e. an understandable and measurable unit for trading, easily
accessible information, as well as uncomplicated and frequently oc-
curring transactions (Coggan et al., 2013). These conditions are rarely
met for ecosystem services and our examples show that they are even
more challenging to meet with insurance value.
Regulation and liability rules can also be used for governing in-
surance value provision (Glaas et al., 2016). For example, land man-
agement can be regulated to maintain landcover that generates in-
surance value. Such regulations could clarify or/and (re)deﬁne the
rights and responsibilities of providers and beneﬁciaries. Regulation
could be the most eﬀective way in terms of transaction costs to secure
insurance value provision in the high transaction cost context of nu-
merous providers and beneﬁciaries when the connection between land
management practices and risk reduction associated with them is well-
known. This is because it reduces the costs of negotiating and con-
tracting, although the transaction costs of seeking information, estab-
lishing rules and monitoring compliance with them and enforcing them
remain (Paavola, 2007). Regulation may be particularly needed when
actors cause exogenous risks and beneﬁciaries cannot be distinguished
(Baumgärtner and Strunz, 2014).
Precautionary responsibilities (Glaas et al., 2016) and soft policy
instruments such as voluntary guidelines and corporate social respon-
sibility could also be used to govern the provision of insurance value.
Pest risk reduction and gradual loss of nutrients and biodiversity are
often addressed through best management practice guidelines and
sustainability criteria designed and monitored by governments, certi-
ﬁcation systems or professional associations (Polasky et al., 2015;
Turnpenny et al., 2014). However, the development of feedback signals
between management and risk would be important for the functioning
of these public-private governance arrangements, and to support the
provision across the collective and the landscape.
The role of the insurance sector could also be harnessed for in-
surance value provision. At the moment, insurance providers are
merely compensating for the losses. Yet they could also change their
mode of operation and ﬁnance the implementation of measures that
reduce the probability and magnitude of losses, such as the main-
tenance of speciﬁc vegetation cover to reduce ﬂood risk or structural
the maintenance of diverse forest structure to control pest infestations.
There are some early signals of uptake of this kind of orientation in the
area of climate change adaptation (Mills, 2009; Glaas et al., 2016).
Public ownership is an alternative when there are numerous bene-
ﬁciaries of insurance value, risk-management driven land-use and
nature-based solutions (see Wachinger et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2016).
Landscape-level planning can support insurance value provision if large
publicly owned areas are used for insurance value provision. While
public schemes also face substantial transaction cost challenges, the
larger scale they often have can render unit cost of information provi-
sion lower in comparison to market based solutions. Public provision
can be further supported by private supply when public payment and
funding schemes are used to contract landowners to change their land
management practices. If payment solutions were developed further,
payments for risk management could be seen as an investment in in-
surance value and could be channelled toward the provision of multiple
jointly produced ecosystem services, and integrated with other payment
schemes, for example for biodiversity and carbon (Corbera et al., 2009;
Primmer et al., 2013).
5.3. Insurance Value as a Collective Action Challenge
Risk management is complex and requires combining multiple
sources of knowledge. Our examples show that the challenges in in-
surance value provision do not focus only on the public-private axis but
also across actors managing the landscape: in a fragmented privately-
owned landscape, where the diﬀerent users and beneﬁciaries of natural
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insurance depend on each other, the insurance value of ecosystems is a
club good (Ostrom, 1990).
Public-sector led and private sector engaging market-like arrange-
ments need to make use of, and encourage, collaborative eﬀorts to
address complex interactions across the landscape. This is partly be-
cause speciﬁc institutional interventions for the provision of insurance
value would not function in isolation (see Vatn and Vedeld, 2012).
Rather, they would interact with the existing institutional framework,
which can be rigid in adapting to the needs of new resilience ap-
proaches (Abrams et al., 2017). Collaboration and network governance
solutions are needed to include and link all relevant actors to address
the mismatches and the spatial inter-connectedness (Paavola, 2016).
This is likely to involve a combination of diﬀerent kinds of institutions
such as existing private property rights, arrangements that support the
formation of landscape level partnerships of diﬀerent stakeholders, as
well as the funding of complementary activities of these partnerships,
which together will amount to a polycentric form of governance
(Ostrom, 2010). Although there is much evidence on the successfulness
of institutional diversity and collaboration in risk management, colla-
boration faces a variety of barriers to do with resources, knowledge and
professional cultures (Fischer and Charnley, 2012; Borg et al., 2015;
Abrams et al., 2017; Sheremet et al., 2018; Paloniemi et al., 2018).
Collaboration of diﬀerent stakeholders is crucial for new polycentric
forms of governance that will have to build new layers of governance on
top of the existing ones. There is some experience from the use of
funding for collective action, which indicates that fostering of colla-
boration requires not only funding but knowledge support, coordina-
tion, engagement and interaction (Primmer et al., 2013; Primmer et al.,
2014; Drechsler and Wätzold, 2017; Paloniemi et al., 2018). But land
managers, forest-owners and home-owners could also team up and
collaborate with their neighbours. In so doing, they could share the
risks of for example temporary pest infestation increase, and the ben-
eﬁts of for example reduced ﬂood risk after implementation of nature-
based solutions.
When ecosystem dynamics are so complex that their insurance
function remains partly or mostly unknown, adaptive governance and
joint learning could be used (Armitage et al., 2008; Ruhl, 2016).
Knowledge management in this kind of settings needs brokers who can
reduce transaction costs and support the transition to more sustainable
and socially optimal setting (Coggan et al., 2013; Kivimaa et al., 2018).
Such brokers often are (but do not need to be) public sector organiza-
tions, who can raise funding from the beneﬁciaries and channel re-
sources to the providers. Public sector or broker support may be par-
ticularly needed in arrangements where land-owners provide multiple
public good like ecosystem services alongside natural insurance, such as
climate regulation and recreation. Again this points the way toward
more polycentric forms of governance for insurance value provision
from modiﬁed ecosystems.
6. Conclusions
Although the insurance value of ecosystems has been acknowledged
in the literature and in the policy agendas, the governance of its pro-
vision remains to be institutionalised. The arrangements for governing
the supply of these provisioning ecosystem services are importantly
shaping the provision of insurance. However, the existing institutions
often ignore natural insurance due to the trade-oﬀs between jointly
produced ecosystem service ﬂows. In particular, joint production of
nature-based solutions requiring coordination across large spatial scales
and collaboration among land owners and managers is overlooked.
Narrowly construed solutions for e.g. shorter-term risk reduction such
as grey infrastructure for ﬂood control or removals of damaged trees
also often undermine ecosystem-based insurance value generation.
Our analysis also shows that some existing governance arrange-
ments, including commercial insurance and liability regulation can
disincentivise precautionary long-term risk management with nature-
based solutions, and steer land-owners and managers away from the
provision of natural insurance. In general, existing institutional ar-
rangements do not acknowledge potential beneﬁciaries' right to pro-
tection, nor potential providers' responsibility.
While there is enthusiasm about the potential of market-like ar-
rangements in the provision of insurance value, our analysis suggests
that they are unlikely to play a major role in insurance value provision.
Insurance value is typically a public good, and organising markets for
its provision entail high transaction costs due to the number of parties
involved and the diﬃculty of determining units of objects of transac-
tions and monitoring of their delivery. Public supply or provision, or
regulation, is needed to buﬀer against risks when transaction costs and
trade-oﬀs are high. That said, public provision does not require public
supply, as public payment schemes can help harnessing private supply
of insurance value, and soft standards can also be used to enhance the
provision of insurance value.
Governance arrangements for insurance value provision need to be
built considering their interaction and ﬁt with the existing institutions:
new arrangements may entail redeﬁning rights and responsibilities. Our
analysis highlights the importance of addressing spatial scales and their
incompatibilities and interdependences when designing governance
responses. This will likely require new layers of institutions and poly-
centric governance involving collaboration and network arrangements
also at the local level, as well as cross-levels, to address the inter-
dependence of areas and actors in insurance value provision.
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